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Realism, in this study, [.  .  .] refers to the illusionistic evocation of a verisimilar 
fictional reality whose convincing presentation correlates particularly with psy-
chological or motivational verisimilitude.
—Fludernik, Towards 131
[. . .] reality is neither the subject nor the object of true art which creates its own 
special reality having nothing to do with the average “reality” perceived by the 
communal eye.
—Nabokov, Pale Fire 106
1. Introduction
How to recover the unnatural essence of the conventional in narrative fic-
tion? The emergent trend of unnatural narratology has drawn its impetus 
mostly from the strikingly transgressive, illogical, or antimimetic elements of 
narrative construction (Richardson Unnatural Voices; Alber; Alber, Iversen, 
Nielsen, and Richardson). Consequently, texts that have established the firm 
ground of literary conventions—such as classical realist novels—have been 
playing the part of default narratives in their representational design as well as 
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in their experiential parameters. I take this collection of essays to be an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that narratives under the heading of realism may even 
have more narratologically transgressive potential than the manifestly antiex-
periential or antinarrative extremes. The approach sketched in this essay may 
not, however, be as much against the unnatural grain as it might first appear, 
since the common aim remains the same: to contest—through theory-defying 
examples—the homogenizing side effects of much contemporary narratology.
vIkTor ShklovSky, the Russian formalist and the eminent hero of classical 
narratologists, left us with an ambiguous concept, estrangement (ostranenie). 
Is art supposed to defamiliarize us from our experience of life or from con-
ventional modes of representation? Or even a trickier question: to what extent 
do the conventions of representation affect our perception of life? At least it 
seems evident that life as such—without art—appeared to him to be an insipid 
series of repetitions.
And so life is reckoned as nothing. Habitualization devours work, clothes, 
furniture, one’s wife, and the fear of war. [. . .] And art exists that one may 
recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the 
stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they 
are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make 
objects “unfamiliar,” to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and 
length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end 
in itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness 
of an object: the object is not important. . . . (18; italics in original)
Shklovsky’s classical formulation triggers at least two possible reactions: to 
consider art (1) as a series of revolutions catalyzed by the avant-garde, or (2), 
even in its most familiar forms, as a vehicle for prolonging the leap from rep-
resentation to assimilation (see Striedter 7; Holquist and Kliger 629–31). The 
former take is supported by the formalist notion of literary evolution, suggest-
ing that an artistic technique, once freshly estranging, wears off quite in the 
manner of the charms of one’s wife (or husband). Yet it seems to me that Shk-
lovsky’s above quoted impressionistic definition makes one incline toward the 
latter notion, to believe that also literary conventions “increase the difficulty 
and length of perception” and are thus intervening in the otherwise sluggish 
dialogue between our minds and our environment. Were this not the case, we 
should accept that a work ceases to be art once its technique becomes automa-
tized by successors.
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 When Shklovsky draws our attention to the “technique of art” and to the 
“process of perception” at the same time, he is inviting us to the same frontier 
where most of the cognitive narratologists are presently camped: the fuzzy 
area where the meeting point of mental and literary representations should 
be found. This is a realm of study where the question of narrative construc-
tion concerns both the text and its reader. But after a closer look at the prem-
ises of cognitive narratology, one cannot but notice that the cognitive agenda 
favors familiarization over defamiliarization: instead of sticking to the materi-
ality of the sign (to the Jakobsonian poetic function), cognitive narratologists 
are anxious to merge mental representations with literary ones. For instance, 
Manfred Jahn suggests that reading a narrative “possibly even requires ‘deictic 
shifts’ to imaginary co-ordinates and places” (“Focalization” 102; my italics, 
M.M.); or, consider Uri Margolin’s stance towards fictional agents:
[.  .  .] we are operating within the confines of a make-believe world, pre-
tending that narrators and storyworld participants exist independently of 
the text which actually creates them via semiotic means, and that they are 
sufficiently human-like so that concepts developed in cognitive science to 
model the activities of actual human minds are applicable to them, even if 
only through analogical transfer. (273; my italics, M.M.)
Eager in demonstrating the general applicability of our mental narrative sche-
mata, cognitive narratologists tend to speak of literary narratives in terms 
of “sense-making” (see, e.g., Alber 79–80); the reader is a navigator, the text 
is a map, and the target is mental assimilation (or apperception; see Jahn 
“Focalization”). The much favored approach to allegedly frame-breaking 
(“new”) literary narratives is to celebrate their potential in enriching the men-
tal framework of readers, the result of which is that these once transgres-
sive texts become naturalized; “fiction as a genre comes to represent precisely 
those impossible naturalized frames and to create readerly expectations along 
those lines” (Fludernik, “Natural Narratology” 255; see also Alber; Fludernik 
“Naturalizing the Unnatural”). It seems evident that from the point of view 
of cognitive narratology, reading fictional narratives is all about diminishing 
the difficulties and the required time in remodeling verbal presentation into 
internal representation—and not the other way around as Shklovsky would 
have it.
 The emergent trend of unnatural narratology has been extremely efficient 
in digging out new, even sui generis cases of narrative (de)construction; yet 
it seems to me that this is innovativeness with regard to one’s corpus but not 
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always theoretically adventurous enough. Still a demand appears to arise for 
some denaturalization of basic theoretical categories that shape our under-
standing of the reading process. On the one hand, cognitive narratology is by 
definition resistant to narrative contingencies since it grounds itself in pro-
totype modeling: the cognitive-narratological prototype reader always opts 
for the most likely, the primary, and the coherent. On the other hand, as far 
as another dominant narratological branch, the Chicago school of rhetori-
cal narratology, is concerned, their insistence on the situatedness of narrative 
communication more often than not frustrates any attempt to focus on details 
that might downplay the communicative situation or even make the story 
incommunicable.
 The recent exposition of unnatural narratology by Alber, Iversen, Nielsen, 
and Richardson makes headway in challenging the easy analogies that have 
been drawn either between real-world schemata and constructed storyworlds 
(116–19), or between actual human agency and verbally constructed voices 
(119–29). Yet if we wish to challenge the idea of the narrative prototype, we 
should not only look for deviations but also work within the alleged prototype, 
which includes established literary conventions and narratives that Alber et al. 
call “ordinary realist texts” (114). Furthermore, we may remember that Flud-
ernik’s Towards a “Natural” Narratology, the most influential advocate for the 
universality of narrative frames, is introducing us not to a class of particular 
texts but instead to frames of reading and interpretation. Consequently, not 
even for Natural Narratology does there exist such a thing as a “natural novel.” 
In fact, Fludernik herself presents us with many of the peculiarities of novel-
istic vraisemblance or synthetic verisimilitude (Towards 129–77). For her, the 
default narrative is a naturally occurring one—even if it is a ghost story and, as 
such, representing things unnatural.
 In what follows I will choose a denaturalizing angle to (1) perception; (2) 
psychological and motivational verisimilitude, and (3) discursive agency 
in a few examples from Flaubert, Tolstoy, and Dickens. However, my cen-
tral assertion is targeted less at particular novelistic modes than the diver-
sity of readerly frames: I wish to demonstrate that many realist conventions 
are peculiarly balanced between the cognitively familiar and the cognitively 
estranging—and, as such, question the reader’s loyalty to naturalization, to 
“‘converting’ the non-natural into a basic cognitive category” (Fluder nik, 
“Natural Narratology” 256). Finally, I will try to sketch a fresh approach to 
unnatural narratology, one that would construe “the reader” not as a mere 
sense-making machine but as someone who might just as well opt for the 
improbable and the indeterminate.
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2. Novelistic Perception: Detail and Disturbance
Let me start with a digression on visual art. In 2009 Jan Alber gave a visiting 
lecture at the University of Tampere on impossible storyworlds and their cog-
nitive reification that started with a reference to unnatural spaces in perspec-
tive drawing. One of the mentioned artists was M. C. Escher, whose Concave 
and Convex (1955) is shown in figure 7.1—a drawing that obviously aims at 
irking and needling our cognitive capacity. Everything is wrong here, and yet 
our basic schemata concerning space, as well as perspective drawing, are trig-
gered. Everyone would agree that the world presented is unnatural—in the 
sense of being physically or architecturally impossible.
 For the sake of comparison, in figure 7.2 you find another piece of art, 
Young Girls at the Sea (Jeunes filles au bord de la mer) by Puvis de Chavannes, 
from the late nineteenth century. I am first to admit that there is nothing strik-
ingly troubling in this painting, no alarming perspectival tricks, no impossible 
shapes. Yet one might ask: which one of the works is more disconcerting—
at the end? The majority of readers would still say Escher, obviously, but we 
might yet stop for another minute with the Puvis painting, with its clear-cut 
contours and semiflat appearance. Acclaimed for his masterful exploitation of 
perspectival conventions, Puvis recovers the flat techniques of the pre-Renais-
sance period and merges them with stylized, partial perspective to create a 
pastichelike reference to early-Renaissance Italian art as well as to relief sculp-
ture: the three women presented do not form a single layer as they would in a 
medieval painting but rather represent three overlapping layers. In the middle, 
the steep shore bank cuts the picture in two and appears to form a unified 
layer with the woman lying on the right; this edge or joint may be the most 
unsettling detail counteracting the naturalization of the scene. The resultant 
effect is that of oscillation between flatness and perspective; between a sense 
of surface and a sense of depth. Young Girls by the Sea does not merely attempt 
at a formal pastiche but is a commentary on the contemporary realistic and 
perspectival aesthetics: Puvis rehabilitates the ornamental and the medium-
specific facet of painting.
 Jeunes filles may lack the alleged cognitive shock effect of Escher, yet the 
prudence and the scarcity with which the painting demonstrates the devia-
tion in perception and space seems to be enough to reflect the type of not-
quite-familiarity we experience with much artistic presentation. Whereas the 
observer is likely to recognize the architectural impossibility of Concave and 
Convex within seconds, to appreciate Puvis’s pseudo-perspectivity is a slower 
process that, furthermore, never really ceases—it would be impossible to 
imagine a moment of recognition, assimilation, or reification. The process of 
figURE 7.1
m. C. ESChER’S ConCAve AnD Convex © ThE m. C. ESChER COmPany—hOlland. all RighTS 
RESERvEd. www.mcescher.com
fIgUre 7.2
YounG GIrls bY The seA, bEfORE 1894 (Oil On CanvaS), PUviS dE ChavannES, PiERRE 
(1824–98), mUSéE d’ORSay, PaRiS, fRanCE/giRaUdOn/ThE bRidgEman aRT libRaRy
maRia mäkElä |  149
perception itself is defamiliarized and left lingering between the naturalizable 
and the irremediably strange; Puvis is able to, in Shklovsky’s words, “increase 
the difficulty and length of perception” and to demonstrate that “the process 
of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged” (18). Yet it is 
the same element of two-dimensionality that makes both Escher’s impossible 
spaces and Puvis’s semiflat representation possible and restores any attempt at 
3D modeling as unnatural.
 The reverse and yet complementary relation between Escher’s drawing 
and Puvis’s painting has its literary equivalent in the relationship between 
postmodernist techniques and—say—Gustave Flaubert. Neither Flaubert nor 
Puvis is a realist proper, but rather their work is a commentary on realism—
they usher us into the backstage of artistic verisimilitude and serve as inter-
mediaries between the before and the after of prototypical realism. Quite in 
the manner of Puvis, Madame Bovary also flaunts the uncanny incongruence 
between the alleged storyworld and its “flat” (textual) construction. The first 
emblem of this tendency is the much-discussed hat of young Charles Bovary, 
described at the very beginning of the novel:
It was one of those hats of the Composite order, in which we find features 
of the military bear-skin, the Polish chapska, the bowler hat, the beaver 
and the cotton nightcap, one of those pathetic things, in fact, whose mute 
ugliness has a profundity of expression like the face of an imbecile. Ovoid 
and stiffened with whalebone, it began with three big circular sausages; 
then, separated by a red band, there alternated diamonds of velours and 
rabbit-fur; after that came a sort of bag terminating in a cardboard poly-
gon, embroidered all over with complicated braid, and, hanging down at 
the end of a long cord that was too thin, a little cluster of gold threads, like 
a tassel. (4)
Are we dealing with an “unnatural” hat? Would Escher or Puvis draw this hat? 
(as Vladimir Nabokov has done; see Nabokov, Lectures 131). The hat is not 
physically or architecturally impossible, yet it seems inconceivable. The farci-
cal accessories and the multilayered structure cannot be assimilated with prior 
knowledge—despite all the schemata made available by the narrator (chapska, 
military or bowler hat, and so on).1 It seems that the ultimate motivation for 
 1. In fact, the entire description reminds one of the cognitive challenge that Lisa Zunshine 
deals with in her cognitive-narratological applications of Theory of Mind studies: the human 
mind is only capable of tracking down four to five levels of intentionality (Zunshine 28–29)—
that is, when trying to figure out embedded mental actions such as “x knows y believes a to be 
mad at c” and so on. A careful reading of Charles’s hat discerns at least five different levels of 
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this allegedly hyperrealist description is the same as in Jeunes filles: to give us 
a sense of paper, or of writing, as juxtaposed with the illusion of immediate 
perception. The flat discourse is incapable of representing the multilayered 
monster of a hat, that is, textuality thwarts mimetic intention.
 To top this off, there is “hanging down at the end of a long cord [. . .] a little 
cluster of gold threads, like a tassel” (“[. . .] en manière de gland”). The descrip-
tion of Charles and Emma’s wedding cake, no less outrageous and incom-
prehensible than the hat, culminates in an analogous simile: at the very top, 
there is “a little Cupid, perched on a chocolate swing, its two poles finished off 
with two real rose-buds, just like knobs, on the top” (“[.  .  .] de rose naturels, 
en guise de boules, au sommet”). These ridiculous minutiae not only are part 
of a pseudo-description but are themselves representative of other artifacts. 
Flaubert’s mock-referentiality seems to suggest that a realist novel in itself is a 
pathetic—if also flamboyant—simile, just as the gold threads in the hat or the 
tacky rosebuds on the cake are there only en manière de something else.
 Yet who perceives, or where is the focus of perception (Genette, Narra-
tive Discourse Revisited 64)? A common take on perception in a realist novel 
emphasizes either omniscience, omnipresence, and control of the strong nar-
rator-figure (as in Dickens), or the psychologically realistic conveyance of 
character focalization (as in Tolstoy or Flaubert). Yet the theoretical notion of 
narrator as focalizer manifests one of the much-discussed breaches between 
classical and postclassical narratology: whereas Chatman (144–45) and Gen-
ette (Narrative Discourse Revisited 74–77) insist on treating the narrator as a 
world-generating agency, both cognitive and rhetorical narratologists would 
rather allocate all fictional agencies—both narrators and character-focaliz-
ers—the same cognitive schemata for world construction (Jahn “Windows”; 
Phelan, “Why” and Living to Tell 114–19). This debate goes too deep into the 
epistemological problems of fiction to be reproduced here, but one might still 
throw on some gasoline by asking whether interpretive confusions in assign-
ing story-internal or story-external cognitive activities to textual agents are, in 
fact, fundamental to literary fiction. Who is ultimately constructing, perceiv-
ing, or reading the storyworld? Consequently, the ambivalent role of the nar-
rator as both the generator and the (re)constructor of the storyworld might 
ornament or material. Zunshine refers to authors such as Woolf and Nabokov to demonstrate 
how “fiction engages, teases, and pushes to its tentative limits our mind-reading capacity” (4) 
but at the same time suggests that the process of mind construction is eventually the same, 
whether we read fiction or our social reality. Yet one would suspect—just as is the case with 
Charles’s hat, as juxtaposed with a real encounter with an extraordinarily ugly headpiece—the 
act of mind construction to be crucially dependent on the difference between textual and per-
ceptual evidence. In the last section of this article, I will briefly discuss the leveling down of 
intention in realist consciousness representation.
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even affect the interpretation of conventionally realist novels. Moreover, as 
I will demonstrate toward the end of my essay, the roles of the narrator and 
character are constantly on the verge of collapsing into one another in canoni-
cal realist consciousness representation (see also Mäkelä “Possible Minds”).
 Again, this underlying unnaturalness is thematized in Flaubert, notably 
in the famous discrepancy between the beginning and the overall design of 
the novel: the story opens with the word “nous,” referring to the schoolmates 
of young Charles Bovary, forming their first unfavorable impression of him 
and his hat; soon after the opening, first-person references gradually give way 
to omniscient narration, the narration thus generating what Jonathan Culler 
calls Flaubert’s elusive narrator (Flaubert).
 Another crucial observation on narrative disturbances in Madame Bovary 
is also made by Culler, albeit over thirty years after his seminal Flaubert study 
(“The Realism”). Let us look at the passage Culler refers to, which happens 
to be one of my personal favorites as well. Here Charles pays a visit to père 
Rouault, yet supposedly to meet Emma, whom he finds alone in the kitchen:
He arrived there one day about three o’clock; everybody was out in the 
fields; he went into the kitchen, but at first didn’t notice Emma; the shutters 
were closed. Through the cracks in the wood, the sun cast along narrow 
stripes of brightness that broke across the angles of furniture and trembled 
on the ceiling. Flies, on the table, were crawling up the glasses left there, 
and buzzing about in the bottom, drowning in the cider dregs. The daylight 
that came down the chimney, turning the soot on the fire-back to velvet, 
touched the cold cinders with blue. Between the window and the hearth, 
Emma was sewing; she wore no fichu, on her bare shoulders you could see 
little drops of sweat. (21)
Several details invite the reader to naturalize the entire description of the stag-
nant, grotesquely aesthetic setting as perceived by Charles: we are told that 
first he does not see Emma, so presumably we should get a report on what he 
did see. Yet, as Culler notes, at the same time we are hard-pressed to imagine 
such exquisite sense of detail (the prismatic effects of light, the drowning flies, 
and the drops of sweat) emanating from Charles’s dull and indelicate dispo-
sition. For Culler, the passage marks one of the cornerstones of Flaubertian 
aesthetics, his desire to frustrate any readerly attempt to personalize narrative 
stances (“The Realism” 690–91). Consequently, Madame Bovary displays a 
world that is realistic: “Realism, one might say, is based on a sense that there is 
a world there, independent of any human meaning or desire, as well as on the 
theme of the world’s resistance to human purposes” (692).
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 How do Culler’s observations and the Flaubertian realism pertain to con-
temporary narratological concerns? First of all, the definition of realism that 
Culler derives from Flaubert’s oeuvre seems somewhat contradictory to the 
notion of “natural” parameters and cognitive verisimilitude. For cognitive nar-
ratology, the storyworld always appears as perceived by someone (even if this 
agent is hypothetical; see Herman “Hypothetical”). As Fludernik’s definition 
of realism has it, from the readerly perspective it is psychological anchoring 
and “motivation” that guarantee the plausibility of the storyworld (Towards 
131, 167). Second of all, the predominant definition of narrative as an expe-
riential mode that grounds itself in the human qualia, in the “what is it like” 
essence of events and worlds (Herman, “Cognition” 256–57), would insinuate 
that the unanchored and unmotivated worlds of realism are, in fact, essentially 
nonnarratable. From the vantage point of cognitive narratology, a narrated 
world which merely “is there” is—unnatural. At this point, a cognitive nar-
ratologist would be eager to place an anthropomorphized narrator-figure in 
the scene to anchor the experience. Yet, as in the above-cited example from 
Madame Bovary, it is precisely the frustration of the figural experience as the 
allegedly firm interpretive footing that creates the experiential void and the 
sense of displacement.
 In fact, one may find an analogous controversy in the archives of clas-
sical narratology. Roy Pascal, fixing his critical eye on psychological veri-
similitude, accuses Flaubert of improbable eloquence, sophistication, and 
exactitude in the representation of figural perception and labels this alleged 
shortcoming “narrative usurpation” (107–10); whereas Brian McHale, in his 
review of Pascal’s study, considers this “usurpation” and the resultant inde-
terminate impressionism as one of the fundaments of Flaubertian poetics 
(400).
 It seems to me that in spite of the fact that Flaubert is an extraordinary 
writer, the indeterminacy of perceptual agency is not something that only 
he cultivates; rather, as is the case with Puvis’s semiperspectivism, Flaubert 
only highlights a feature that is always already present in textualized, liter-
ary constructions of human perception.2 At this point we may be reminded 
of Henry James’s “house of fiction,” a metaphor that Manfred Jahn revives in 
his discussion on focalization: narrators are seated outside the house of fiction 
looking in through their respective windows; focalizing characters inhabit 
the house of fiction, holding mirrors that reflect the insides of the house, thus 
providing new coordinates for the narrators’ perceptions (Jahn, “Windows” 
 2. For some apt remarks in the same vein, see Tammi.
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251–52). Jahn insists that the Jamesian notion of perceiving narrators admits 
the reader to an imaginary perceptual position in (relation to) the storyworld 
(258). What Jahn’s conceptual metaphor does not account for is the inevitable 
fact that a representation that entails layered perceptual agency (character/
narrator/reader) is not a static setting or scene but involves constant traffic 
in and out the house of fiction; perception and construction overlap inextri-
cably. The entering Charles Bovary and the drowning flies issue exactly such 
a challenge to our reading by questioning a naturalized relationship between 
perception and verbal construction on any level of cognitive mental func-
tioning—diegetic, extradiegetic, or extratextual. A cognitive approach resting 
uncompromisingly on natural perceptual agency in narrative texts is not able 
to account for this traffic and disturbance.
 The example of Charles and the flies betrays one further characteristic typ-
ical of realist textual architecture. A frequent argument in favor of the immer-
sive and illusionist quality of realist fiction arises from the level of detail. Yet 
one might argue, as does literary critic James Wood from his privileged posi-
tion outside narratological debates, that the obsession with verisimilar detail 
in realist fiction is, in fact, rather countercognitive. Wood is affected by Flau-
bert’s devotion to detail, which, according to Wood, manifests as selection (not 
as randomness imitating on-line perception); Flaubert’s details are “frozen 
in their gel of chosenness” (33). The effect is that of both recognition and 
estrangement. It is as if the flies in the kitchen of Rouault are dipped not only 
into the cider dregs but into the “gel of chosenness”: the traces of selection 
imply intentional construction, and yet the effect is that of a “world just being 
there”—all sorts of beautiful banality taking place beyond the mediocre inter-
ests of Charles Bovary.
 Moreover, the metonymic essence of realist descriptions creates an effect 
of—not precision but—disproportion. As the famous definition of Barthes 
goes, the code of effet de réel should be invisible to a reader accustomed to 
novelistic conventions (“The Reality Effect”); in other words, the extrapola-
tion of the storyworld from metonymic evidence should be a naturalized pro-
cedure. Yet if we were to follow Wood in recognizing the “gel of chosenness,” 
we might want to conclude that the constructed perception of the Rouault 
kitchen is more grotesque than natural; the flies obtain an unmerited posi-
tion, they swell with nonmeaning (see also Mäkelä, “Heavy Flies”). From this 
perspective, realism would seem to be an art more of distortion than of repro-
duction. The uncanny construction of storyworlds in realism might even sug-
gest that there are some fundamental narrative elements that disconfirm the 
Gestalt-psychological assumption of the human mind as coherence-driven.
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3. Distortions of Psychological and Motivational
 Verisimilitude
As already mentioned, the notion of narrativity as mediated experientiality 
lays heavy emphasis on “psychological and motivational verisimilitude” (Flud-
ernik, Towards 131), on story-internal elements as being convincingly situated 
within the parameters of embodied human experience. My earlier discussion 
centered on distortions of on-line perception on a narrative micro level that 
manifested as ambivalent perceptual agency and as nonholistic world con-
struction. The tricky subject of motivation should, however, be addressed on 
a larger narrative scale. In the following, I wish to make a short note on prob-
lems having to do with the incongruence between compositional and psycho-
logical motivation in literary realism. Typically, the hackneyed conception of 
realism as faithfully depicting the harsh human condition goes hand in hand 
with a heavy reliance on psychological motivation. In such a reading, every 
detail and every narrative choice is interpreted as shedding light on a particu-
lar experience in particular circumstances. Yet the most beloved realists are 
like Tolstoy or Dickens: the ones capable of creating vividness and richness of 
life which is almost unimaginable and always dislocated.
 The following passage from Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina describes the 
moment when Anna is just about to arrive to comfort her sister-in-law. Dolly 
has learned that her happy-go-lucky husband, Stepan Arkadyevich, is having 
an affair with their children’s governess:
When Anna came in, Dolly was sitting in the small drawing room with a 
plump, tow-headed boy who already resembled his father, listening as he 
recited a French lesson. The boy was reading, his hand twisting and trying 
to tear off the barely attached button of his jacket. His mother took his 
hand away several times, but the plump little hand would take hold of the 
button again. His mother tore the button off and put it in her pocket. (66)
Read in its immediate context, psychological motivation starts to emanate 
from this description. First, one would assume that it is Anna who witnesses 
this comforting domestic scene on her arrival to a home where “all was con-
fusion”; perhaps the “plump little hand” is investigated with an endearing eye 
that might very well belong to Anna, the sweet aunt of the Oblonsky children. 
Furthermore, it is noted that Grisha, the little boy, “already resembled his 
father,” an observation that Dolly herself would not be prone or eager to make 
in her circumstances; whereas the sister of Stepan Arkadyevich, not having 
seen the family in a long time, obviously would. This evident interpretation is 
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launched at the outset by pinning down the scene to a moment “when Anna 
came in.” Strangely enough, the perception becomes dislocated in the light of 
the following events: after the episode with the loose button, Dolly returns to 
her own knitting and the narrator takes off to describe Dolly’s anguish and 
anxiety that she must bear in the middle of domestic bustle. Then, after one 
page, another description of Anna’s entrance follows:
Hearing the rustle of a dress and light footsteps already at the door, she 
turned, and her careworn face involuntarily expressed not joy but surprise. 
[. . .]
 “This is Grisha? My God, how he’s grown!” said Anna [. . .]
 She took off her scarf and hat and, catching a strand of her dark, curly 
hair in it, shook her head, trying to disentangle it.
 “And you are radiant with happiness and health,” said Dolly, almost 
with envy. (67)
Would the confusion be a mere blunder on the part of the reader, who would 
now conclude that Anna was entering the house in the beginning of the chap-
ter and only later reaching the small drawing room where Dolly and Grisha are 
seated? That is unlikely, since the juxtaposition of contradictory “first impres-
sions” proves thematically productive. To whom belongs the eye for small 
domestic charms—or is the tableau and the little button more a reflection of 
anxiety than of comforting ordinariness? When Anna and Dolly meet, we also 
witness an encounter between two “unhappy families” (cf. Dolly’s musings 
on Anna’s marriage: “there was something false in the whole shape of their 
family life,” 66). The ambivalent descriptions of Anna’s entrance resonate with 
the transformation that Anna is to experience during her stay in Moscow: 
after the fateful night at the ball when Anna lets Vronsky enrapture her, the 
Oblonsky children who were formerly charmed by Anna start to neglect her. 
This reversal of destinies and positions is foreshadowed in Dolly’s thoughts 
on Anna’s arrival: “After all, she’s not guilty of anything” (66). The narration 
evokes a possibility that Anna would be the one to appreciate the “plump little 
hands”3 but later thwarts this interpretation to give more emphasis to Anna’s 
own glamorous appearance.
 Yet the web of possible motivations does not limit itself here; another psy-
chological motivation, just as plausible, has been there all along. What if the 
 3. Peculiarly enough, the impersonal perception of Grisha’s hands points toward autho-
rial usurpation: it is Tolstoy the author who seems to be obsessed with children’s—and Napo-
leon’s!—plump little hands; they occur at least in War and Peace, The Cossacks, and Childhood, 
Boyhood, and Youth.
156 |  7 :  REaliSm and ThE UnnaTURal
entire scene with the button and the plump little hands is focalized through 
Dolly? That said, the composition appears to be completely different: if Gri-
sha’s resemblance to his father is Dolly’s observation, then the “plump and 
tow-headed” boy is not that sweet anymore, and the plump little hands that 
pull the button are more annoying than charming. Why else would Dolly have 
torn the button off? A change of motivational perspective makes little Grisha 
a potential future adulterer, already as restless and self-indulgent as his father.
 A common claim adopted from modernists such as James and Lubbock is 
that Tolstoy’s prose lacks artistic form but, as a compensation, is able to pro-
vide us with a sense of uncontrollable flow of life (see Greenwood); yet there 
are critics who are claiming just the opposite and demonstrating how Tolstoy’s 
narrative choices—and their frequent indiscernibility (why mention the but-
ton?)—reflect his grand theme of determinism and freedom of choice, the 
undecided balancing between predestined form and existential randomness 
(Alexandrov 290–98). This seeming indecision between significant and insig-
nificant detail is highlighted in the contradictory angles to Anna’s arrival: the 
loose button would, at a first blush, seem to be in the service of l’effet de réel, 
furnishing our impression of Dolly’s domestic reality; whereas the charming 
details of Anna’s presence (“light footsteps”), attire (“rustle of a dress”), and 
coiffure (“dark, curly hair”) evidently provide a striking contrast to Dolly’s 
“careworn face.” For a moment at least, the loose button seems to imply that 
realism defies relevance just as domesticity defies romance and tellability. (See 
also Mäkelä “Heavy Flies.”)
 Again, as in the Flaubert example with Charles and the flies, the conven-
tion of figural perception is abused: in lieu of allowing a smooth deictic shift 
into the fictional reality, the narration searches for an angle to the storyworld 
in a process of constant, unstable deictic shifting. The narrative does not dis-
play itself as relevant but as in search of relevance; the role of detail is under 
negotiation. What is striking is that this ambivalence grounds itself precisely 
in the possibility of a fictional world “just being there,” independent of any 
narrative interest. With a realist text full of psychologically or structurally 
seemingly unanchored elements, we might want to return to Lotman’s always 
fresh observation on the reading experience as a networking of multiple rela-
tions: “[w]hat is extra-systemic [or: asystemic, see Alexandrov 291] in life is 
represented as polysystemic in art” (72). As Lotman explains it, the multiplic-
ity of possible connections and motivations creates an illusion of freedom 
(and, thus, perhaps, of “life”), whereas a detail that is clearly linked to some 
holistic framework has a very constricted thematic potential.
 All this brings me back to the question of “natural” and “unnatural” narra-
tives. Alber outlines five strategies with which readers make sense of “extreme” 
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narratives that defy the parameters of human experientiality. According to 
Alber, the readers either (1) graft the disturbing nonmimetic element onto 
some other than mimetically motivated structure (“reading events as internal 
states”; “foregrounding the thematic”; “reading allegorically”), or (2) accept 
the nonmimetic element as an extension of their own parameters (“blending 
scripts”; “frame enrichment”).4 These strategies appear to me as most general 
readerly procedures taken in search of coherence—and as such, they are an 
apt and welcome addition to the cognitive-narratological toolkit. Yet one is 
left wondering whether this approach would issue any challenge to prevalent 
approaches.
 One of Alber’s examples, Caryl Churchill’s postmodernist play Heart’s 
Desire, displays mutually exclusive plotlines or “retakes” of a character enter-
ing a scene, which Alber naturalizes as manifestations of the characters’ fanta-
sies, traumas, and narrative perfectionism. What is the fundamental difference 
between the contradictory entrances in Churchill’s play and the perceptually 
and motivationally ambivalent entrance scene in Anna Karenina—if both of 
their effects can be enveloped with the same holistic schemata? Just as per-
spective drawing enables both Escher’s and Puvis’s distorted visions of space, 
textual story construction makes it possible for both Tolstoy and the post-
modernists to transcend real-life parameters. Conversely, both are also unable 
to provide a full immersion and a complete congruence with real-life experi-
ence—a state of affairs which, I think, is much more foregrounded by novel-
istic conventions than many a narratologist would ever acknowledge. Alber’s 
analyses seem to suggest that a cognitive apperception through psychological 
or thematic motivation is necessary: that there would be no two ways about it, 
no balancing between chance randomness and motivated structure.5 Such a 
reading seems, paradoxically, to transform physically or logically impossible 
storyworlds into narratives that are more vulnerable to easy naturalization 
than any text from mainstream classical realism. In Flaubert or Tolstoy, com-
positional motivation repeatedly overrides embodied and situated perception 
and reflection, which creates an imbalance that never really gets restored.
 Much of the unnaturalness associated with postmodernism has to do with 
temporality (see Richardson, “Narrative Poetics” 24–32). However, from the 
readerly point of view, reading Tolstoy and reading postmodernist fiction is 
just as unnatural: the relationship between the succession of words and the 
succession of fictional events is just as incongruent, and the entire temporal 
 4. In his contribution to this volume, Alber reorders and extends these navigational tools.
 5. To be fair, one must mention that Alber indeed recognizes the “other” interpretive 
stance, the one that enjoys ambiguity and does not encourage naturalization. Alber calls this 
stance the “Zen way of reading” but is obviously doubtful of its validity and prevalence (83–84).
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dimension is a mere metaphor in both cases. The unnaturalness of temporal 
conventions in fiction is brilliantly revealed by James Wood’s analysis of nov-
elistic descriptions that lump together dynamic and habitual detail—a mode 
perfected by none other than good Flaubert. Wood discusses an example from 
Sentimental Education, where Frédéric strolls idly through the Latin Quarter 
in Paris and the omniscient narrator both is and is not tracking the percep-
tion of the hero: “At the back of the deserted cafés, women behind the bars 
yawned between their untouched bottles; the newspapers lay unopened on 
the reading-room tables; in the laundresses’ workshops the washing quivered 
in the warm draughts” (cited in Wood 33). As Wood writes, “the women can-
not be yawning for the same length of time as the washing is quivering or 
the newspapers are lying on the tables” (34). Such illusions of simultaneity 
acquired through nonnaturalizable, multitemporal perception are veritable 
commonplaces in post-Flaubertian fiction, and yet, from a cognitive vantage 
point, they must be unnatural. But, then again, there is nothing really new in 
contradictory plotlines, either. What unnatural narratology should do is to 
reach for what is beyond the conventional/unconventional or the legitimate/
disruptive divide and pay closer attention to the subtleties in the use of non-
naturalizable frames.
 One of the most notorious concepts to undervalue the unnatural elements 
in realist fiction is immersion, as referring to an illusionist transition both into 
the storyworld and into the experiential plane of characters. Even in Marie-
Laure Ryan’s otherwise elegant study on immersion and interactivity in litera-
ture and electronic media, the novels of “high realism” have been allotted the 
role of immersive texts that, by rendering their worlds as seemingly indepen-
dent of language (Ryan 158–59), do not activate the element of “play” in the 
reading process (175–76, 199). For Ryan, one of the authors creating highly 
worldlike and immersive narratives is Dickens, a writer who, it seems to me, 
has a tendency to try out different angles on his storyworld in a fluid manner 
that, in fact, counteracts easy immersion. Consider the following passage from 
Bleak House:
What connexion can there be, between the place in Lincolnshire, the house 
in town, the Mercury in powder, and the whereabouts of Jo the outlaw 
with the broom, who had that distant ray of light upon him when he swept 
the churchyard step? What connexion can there have been between many 
people in the innumerable histories of this world, who, from opposite sides 
of great gulfs, have, nevertheless, been very curiously brought together!
 Jo sweeps his crossing all day long, unconscious of the link, if any link 
there be. He sums up his mental condition, when asked a question, by 
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replying that he ‘don’t know nothink.’ He knows that it’s hard to keep the 
mud off the crossing in dirty weather, and harder still to live by doing it. 
(256)
Instead of transporting the reader into the muddy and smoggy fictional Lon-
don, the Dickensian narrator simulates the process of ostensible immersion 
itself. First, it seems that the narrating presence hovers above the strangely 
connected fictional universe, contemplating the dynamics of detail and moti-
vation. After that the narration makes a dive into the experiential plane of the 
proletarian Jo and the realm of diegetic ignorance of the holistic composition, 
and yet this is a dive that is pronouncedly simulated: the spatial sensation 
of the transition is not that of outside-in but of top-down, a vertical move-
ment down the staircase of narrative hierarchy. The shift proves a mere parody 
of immersion when Jo is being asked (by the metaleptic narrator who has 
stepped down to the diegetic level, presumably) about his experience of being-
in-the-fictional-world: he “don’t know nothink.”
 What is more, the passage goes on to reveal the mechanisms of discursive 
simulation behind the representation of fictional consciousness; this is how 
the narrator of Bleak House continues his fake expedition in the figural expe-
riential plane, wondering how illiteracy must affect Jo’s perspective on life:
It must be a strange state to be like Jo! [.  .  .] To see people read, and to 
see people write, and to see the postmen deliver letters, and not to have 
the least idea of all that language—to be, to every scrap of it, stone blind 
and dumb! It must be very puzzling to see the good company going to the 
churches on Sundays, with their books in their hands, and to think (for 
perhaps Jo does think, at odd times) what does it all mean, and if it means 
anything to anybody, how comes it that it means nothing to me? To be 
hustled, and jostled, and moved on; and really to feel that it would appear 
to be perfectly true that I have no business, here, or there, or anywhere; and 
yet to be perplexed by the consideration that I am here somehow, too, and 
everybody overlooked me until I became the creature that I am! [. . .] His 
whole material and immaterial life is wonderfully strange; his death, the 
strangest thing of all. (257–58)
As Dickens demonstrates, the illusion of immersion concerns figural language 
as well: his authoritarian narrator’s voice smooths out his plunge into Jo’s con-
structed consciousness by setting out in a hypothetical mode (“It must be very 
puzzling  .  .  .”), which only gradually accumulates into an illusion of figural 
inner discourse with first-person reference (“.  .  . how comes it that it means 
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nothing to me”). In here and elsewhere in Bleak House, Dickens clearly under-
mines the authority of the conventional omniscient narrator, the alleged land-
mark of the literature of his own era, by creating impenetrable minds whose 
workings can only be guessed at. As Terry Eagleton notes in his preface to the 
2003 Penguin edition of Bleak House, it is as if the characters were surrounded 
by the same fog of mystery as the London setting and the notorious Chancery 
Court (viii). The literary narrator is only capable of constructing a verbal ver-
sion of the illiterate Jo’s confused mind—a construction which, conversely, 
Jo himself would be unable to read. Although at this point Dickens seems 
to be rather unconventional, the process of constructing the fictional mind 
of Jo reveals the essential mechanisms of “realist” consciousness representa-
tion at large.6 Moreover, unlike Flaubert and Tolstoy, Dickens is no master 
of free indirect discourse, and perhaps that is precisely why he can give such 
an elaborate demonstration of the mode’s boundary conditions, of its strange 
locus between authorial hypothesis and constructed figural idiom. In the next 
section we will develop these lines of thoughts further. 
4. Schematic Consciousnesses and Nonderivable
 Discursive Agency
As Ryan points out in her discussion of immersive realism, “[t]he ‘reality 
effect’ of nineteenth-century fiction is achieved by the least natural, most 
ostentatiously fictional of narrative techniques—omniscient narration, free 
indirect discourse, and variable focalization” (159). By reading Ryan or almost 
any other contemporary narratologist one might conclude that the conven-
tions of omniscience and third-person experientiality have been most pain-
lessly naturalized and have long since ceased to interfere with the reading 
process (see, e.g., Fludernik, Towards 48): “telling can be dispensed with, 
readers simply orient themselves to a position within the fictional world [. . .] 
frames naturally available only for one’s own experience become accessible for 
application to a third person.” The example from Bleak House speaks against 
this ease and accessibility and reveals the significant thematic import of the 
ultimate unreadability of minds.
 Paradoxically, however, the naturalized unnaturalness of omniscience is 
replaced by a truly natural method of mind construction: the narrator of Bleak 
 6. In fact, Wilhelm Füger’s classical, yet only recently translated, study on the limits of 
narratorial knowledge (“Limits”) suggests that epistemic restrictions in the allegedly omniscient 
narratorial mode might be more the rule than the exception. Füger’s test case is Fielding’s Joseph 
Andrews, a novel frequently used as a textbook example of “omniscience.”
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House constructs Jo’s mind via schematization and typification; mechanisms 
that, according to Fludernik, are a common means to reproduce someone else’s 
spoken or inner discourse (Fictions 398–433). The narrator seems to reach Jo’s 
inner discourse by applying plausible frames of verbalization: “the good com-
pany going to the churches on Sundays, with their books in their hands, [. . .] 
what does it all mean, and if it means anything to anybody, how comes it that 
it means nothing to me?” As Fludernik has shown, discourse representation 
relies on prototypical discourse schemata and results in approximations, not 
reproductions. All of this has to do with the cognitive scientific notion of 
sense-making as frame application: our approach to new situations is always 
based on our constructive knowledge of previous contexts. It is through this 
evoking of discursive schemata, writes Fludernik, that the ghost (“linguistic 
hallucination,” 453) of the figural voice arises from our interpretation of free 
indirect discourse. Consequently, one might say that the aura of unnaturalness 
or pronounced literariness of representing consciousness or omniscient nar-
ration has started to fade in the wake of cognitive approaches: just as we are 
all weaving narratives out of our own experience, we are also constructors of 
other people’s experiences.
 Both the narrative and the readerly mechanisms of constructing the char-
acters’ interiority have severe consequences for the interpretation of the so-
called psychological realism. What is more, realists such as Dickens, Tolstoy, 
and most notably Flaubert precisely juxtapose narrative and readerly con-
struction: the characters, the narrators, and the readers are ultimately tackling 
the shared problem posed by the alien mind. Consider, for example, Anna’s 
stiff and dispassionate husband, Karenin, slowly and laboriously adjusting his 
one-track mind to the fact that his wife is having an affair with Vronsky. For 
Karenin, the point of irreversible revelation is also a disturbing moment of 
intermental recognition and involuntary mindreading:
For the first time [Karenin] vividly pictured to himself [his wife’s] personal 
life, her thoughts, her wishes, and the thought that she could and should 
have her own particular life seemed so frightening to him that he hastened 
to drive it away. It was that bottomless deep into which it was frightening to 
look. To put himself in thought and feeling into another being was a mental 
act alien to Alexei Alexandrovich. He regarded this mental act as harmful 
and dangerous fantasizing. (143–44)
One of the most illuminating findings in cognitive narratology has to do with 
the analogousness of figural, narratorial, and readerly construction processes: 
as Lisa Zunshine’s (Why We Read) and Alan Palmer’s (Fictional Minds) studies 
162 |  7 :  REaliSm and ThE UnnaTURal
suggest, much of novelistic interpretation relies on our natural ability to infer 
mental states and actions from outward behavior. The approaches underscor-
ing Theory of Mind and intersubjectivity shed a critical light on classical nar-
ratology’s linguistic interest in speech categories (indirect/direct/free indirect 
discourse) and thus on the problematic construction called figural voice (see, 
e.g., Palmer 9–12, 57–69). This is all well-deserved, and in the study of fic-
tional minds, cognitive narratology has proved a genuine blessing.
 Yet there is one shortcoming that both classical and cognitive narratology 
share in their approaches to fictional minds, something that could be termed 
the easy-access fallacy. According to the classical theorist Franz K. Stanzel, 
“[r]ealistic presentation of consciousness seems to require the illusion of 
immediacy. [. . .] Interior monologue, free indirect style and figural narrative 
situation [. . .] suggest immediacy, that is, the illusion of direct insight into the 
character’s thoughts” (127). For Zunshine, the main task in reading fiction is 
“keep[ing] track of who thought, wanted, and felt what and when” (5). Both 
approaches rather outspokenly suggest that there is an inside to be found if we 
just dig deep enough. However, if we look at even the most canonized pieces 
of free indirect discourse in Madame Bovary, we may notice how the entire 
division into inside and outside appears strikingly illusory:
Charles’s conversation was as flat as any pavement. [. . .] He couldn’t swim, 
or fence or shoot, and he wasn’t able to explain, one day, a riding term 
which she had come across in a novel. (38)
Why could she not be leaning out on the balcony of a Swiss chalet, or hid-
ing her sadness in a cottage in Scotland, with a husband wearing a long-
tailed black velvet coat, and soft boots, appointed hat and frills on his shirt! 
(38)
Now the bad days of Tostes came back again. This time she thought herself 
far more unhappy: for she was experienced in sorrow, with the certainty 
that it would never end. Any woman who had imposed such great sacri-
fices on herself could well be permitted a few fancies.7 She bought a Gothic 
prie-dieu, and in one month she spent fourteen francs on lemons for clean-
ing her nails. [. . .] (115)
The prominent characteristic of free indirect discourse is its capacity to level 
 7. In the French original, this reads as follows: “Une femme qui s’était imposé de si grands 
sacrifices pouvait bien passer des fantaisies” ( 217).
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down the hierarchy of voices—or the levels of intentionality, as Zunshine 
would have it—so as to downplay the discursive agency supposedly lurking 
behind the expression. Sentences such as “Charles’s conversation was as flat 
as any pavement” or “Any woman who had imposed such great sacrifices on 
herself could well be permitted a few fancies” can and will, obviously, be natu-
ralized as displaying Emma’s postures, but the form is not that of immediate 
impression but of narrative takeover, even rhetorical intention. Already Pas-
cal’s dual-voice hypothesis suggests that “narrative usurpation” may happen 
either way around (107–10): (1) The flat, nonderivable essence of fictional 
utterances permits the character to authorize her own view by appropriating 
the discursive locus of the narrator (see Mäkelä “Masters”). (2) Conversely, 
narrators such as the heterodiegetic one in Bleak House flaunt this freedom 
by constructing the apparent inner discourse of characters through discursive 
schemata that best serve their narrative purposes. Thus an apparently real-
ist rendering of inner figural discourse is also bound to demonstrate its own 
inherent impossibility: a narrative can only represent the narrative construc-
tion of an experience, not the “raw feels” of immediate impression. Thus also 
the notion of psychological immersion turns out to be highly debatable.
 Consequently, the last facets of novelistic conventions that I suggest for 
further denaturalization are voice or discursive agency and the fictional mind 
in general. Whether we foreground the narratorial or the figural intentions 
in consciousness representation, the result is far from displaying clear-cut, 
derivable cognitive agencies. All we have is narrative usurpers. Flaubert’s free 
indirect discourse is a case in point. Consider the above-cited passage describ-
ing the pseudoverbalized tableau of romantic mountain scenes and a husband 
“wearing a long-tailed black velvet coat, and soft boots, appointed hat and frills 
on his shirt” evolving in Emma’s mind. The sentence is capable of conveying 
both distance from and association with Emma’s emotional state. The exclam-
atory syntax that accumulates into a disturbingly minute description of the 
imaginary husband’s gallant costume would obviously reflect Emma’s ennui 
and fancies. Yet the entire tableau, in its lovingly rendered detail, reminds the 
reader more of the same elusive novelistic agency that might be responsible for 
recording the above-presented drowning flies in cider dregs. In fact, Genette 
has paid attention to this very same phenomenon, noting that the accuracy in 
the descriptions of Emma’s fantasies counteracts internalization: one would 
rather expect hazy and nonspecific impressions instead of poetically detailed 
descriptions of the fantasy milieus (Figures I 227–28). Again, it seems that the 
natural frames of story-internal experientiality are evoked merely with an eye 
on exploiting them and recovering the flat, nonderivable essence of novelistic 
discursive agency.
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5. Conclusion: Unnatural Reading
From the point of view suggested in this essay, the literary tokens of unnatu-
ralness would obviously seem countless. I have only been able to touch upon 
some specimens: dislocations in perception; ambivalence between motiva-
tion and arbitrariness; and finally, the ultimate impossibility of deriving cog-
nitive—and particularly discursive—agencies from novelistic representation. 
Yet my chief aim has been to shift the focus of unnatural narratology from 
taxonomy of narratives more toward offering a counterforce to those current 
narratological trends that are eager to assimilate all types of narrative con-
struction under the same umbrella framework.
 I have also been trying to demonstrate that, as is the case with artists such 
as Escher and Puvis, the distinction between conventional and deviant narra-
tives is far from clear-cut. Should we embrace Alber’s classification of possible 
strategies with which we approach impossibilities in narratives—something, 
as I think, we can very well do—we should conclude that the unnaturalness 
of the storyworlds or plotlines (causing readerly “discomfort, fear, or worry,” 
Alber 83) is only a textual surface under which the reader is tempted to find 
the psychologically, motivationally, or thematically verisimilar. To me, it seems 
just as unimaginable to assume a storyworld independent of representation as 
it would be to base my interpretation of Concave and Convex or Jeunes filles au 
bord de la mer on the assumptions about the “real” sceneries preceding the act 
of representation.
 Consequently, I should think an emphasis on unnatural reading to be a 
more tenable footing for unnatural narratology. The approaches probed in 
this essay are counterimmersive, and yet I do not believe them to be counter-
intuitive. The novelistic techniques of Flaubert, Tolstoy, and Dickens seem to 
be in a constant motion between surface and depth, appealing to both cog-
nitive familiarity and cognitive estrangement. On my reading, it is precisely 
this unresolvable motion that introduces a Shklovskian delay between text 
and cognition. A denaturalized approach to allegedly naturalized conventions 
might even attest that the uncanniness of textual world and mind construction 
plays a significant role in the “normal”—or “prototypical”—reading experi-
ence, since many narrators/authors “trust the reader appreciates the strange-
ness of this, because if he does not, there is no sense in writing poems, or notes 
to poems, or anything at all” (Pale Fire 164–65). In fact, this hypothesis is my 
primary reason for not replacing the notion of the unnatural with the more 
established concept of estrangement: the impetus for unnatural narratology 
springs from a desire to provide some new coordinates for narrative theory at 
large.
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